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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO.  44756
)
v. ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2014-9859
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Regan Adeng contends the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his
probation and executed his underlying sentence in this case.  Rather, a sufficient consideration of
all the mitigating factors, particularly including the new change in Mr. Adeng’s mental health
diagnosis, reveals that a continued term of probation would better serve all the goals of
sentencing.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the order revoking Mr. Adeng’s probation and
remand this case for the district court to return him to probation.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
A jury initially convicted Mr. Adeng of possession of methamphetamine, misdemeanor
possession of marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.131-34.)1
The mental health evaluations conducted at that time diagnosed Mr. Adeng only with alcohol
abuse, and concluded he did not present with a serious mental illness (hereinafter, SMI).
(PSI, pp.145, 154-55.)  The district court imposed, and initially executed, a unified sentence of
seven years, with two years fixed, for the methamphetamine charge, and concurrent 180-day
sentences for the two misdemeanors.2  (R., pp.143-46.)  Mr. Adeng filed a notice of appeal from
that judgment and challenged the district court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress, but the
Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Adeng, 2016 WL 4413307 (Ct. App. 2016), unpublished.
Mr. Adeng also filed a timely motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35.  (R., p.139.)  The
district court granted that motion, deciding to retain jurisdiction over the case rather than simply
execute the sentences.  (R., pp.159-61.)  Mr. Adeng participated in the traditional rider program
during that period of retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.163-64.)  Despite having some disciplinary
issues during that program, Mr. Adeng was able to complete two of his three assigned classes.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.193-94.)3  The  rider  staff  ultimately
recommended the district court suspend Mr. Adeng’s sentence for a period of probation.  (PSI,
p.192.)  New mental health evaluations at that time diagnosed Mr. Adeng as suffering from a
mood disorder not otherwise specified, but concluded this still did not qualify as an SMI.  (PSI,
1 The record prepared in this case was augmented with the record from Mr. Adeng’s prior appeal,
Docket Number 42991.  (R., p.2.)  However, the two volumes are consecutively paginated, and
so, will simply be referred to as “R.”
2 With the subsequent award of credit for time served, the two misdemeanor sentences have been
completely served.  (See R., p.266.)
3 All citations to “PSI” are to the PDF “Adeng 44756 psi” which was provided with the new
limited record.
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pp.182-83, 189.)  Therefore, those evaluations recommended counselling to help Mr. Adeng
better address life stress, his addictions, and past trauma, but they did not recommend any
specific mental health treatment.  (See, e.g., PSI, pp.183-84.)  The district court ultimately
followed the rider staff’s recommendation and suspended Mr. Adeng’s sentence for a five-year
term of probation.  (R., pp.167-73.)
A little over a year later, the State filed a motion for probation violation, alleging
Mr. Adeng had violated the terms of his probation in several ways.  (R., pp.209-12.)  His
probation officer noted that intermediate options, such as imposition of a curfew, instigation of a
behavior contract, and a job search requirement, had been used to try to address the violations.
(R.,  p.215.)   Pursuant  to  a  plea  agreement,  Mr.  Adeng  agreed  to  admit  to  several  of  those
allegations, with the State dismissing the remainder.  (Tr., p.5, Ls.18-25.)4  Specifically, he
admitted having a new misdemeanor conviction for inattentive driving, using methamphetamine
on two occasions, failing to complete a vocational rehabilitation program and the rider aftercare
program, and failing to attend or find a sponsor for his participation in the AA program.  (See
Tr., p.5, Ls.18-25; R., pp.209-12.)
The district court ordered an updated PSI with new mental health evaluations.  (Tr., p.17,
Ls.19-24.)  The updated PSI noted that Mr. Adeng was struggling to deal with his brother’s
death, which happened approximately three months after he was placed on probation.  (See PSI,
p.17; R., p.167.)  Defense counsel explained that his brother’s death had left Mr. Adeng “in a
very dark place and he couldn’t get himself out.”  (Tr., p.26, Ls.22-23.)  As a result, Mr. Adeng
was unable to open up about that event or its impact on him and his mental health because of the
pain of his grief.  (Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.3.)
4 All citations to “Tr.” in this brief refer to the volume prepared for this appeal which contains
the transcripts of the most recent admit/deny and disposition hearings.
4
As a result, the mental health evaluations now concluded Mr. Adeng presented with an
SMI or other mental health needs based on rule-out diagnoses for major depressive disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder or other acute stress disorder.
(See, e.g., PSI, pp.27, 41.)  They recommended he receive intensive outpatient treatment with
psychiatric medication and individual and group therapy.  (PSI, pp.38, 42.)  Nevertheless,
Mr. Adeng acknowledged that he had not been able to comply with the terms of his probation
and took responsibility for that failure.  (Tr., p.28, Ls.2-5.)  As such, he requested the district
court consider placing him back on probation.  (Tr., p.28, Ls.11-13.)
The district court rejected that request.  It pointed to the fact that Mr. Adeng had a long
history of misdemeanor offenses, though (as the parties corrected the judge), the underlying
offense was only Mr. Adeng’s second felony conviction.  (Tr., p.30, L.8 - p.32, L.14.)  There was
no discussion of Mr. Adeng’s new mental health diagnoses or the recommendations for
treatment.   (See generally Tr.)  Ultimately, the district court decided to revoke Mr. Adeng’s
probation and execute his underlying sentence.  (Tr., p.29, L.24 - p.30, L.3.)  Mr. Adeng filed a
notice of appeal timely from that order.  (R., pp.266, 269.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Adeng’s probation and executing
his underlying sentence.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Adeng’s Probation And Executing
His Underlying Sentence
The  decision  to  revoke  probation  is  one  within  the  district  court’s  discretion.
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000).  A district court abuses its discretion when
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it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion, acts beyond the outer limits of that discretion
or inconsistent with the applicable legal standards, or does not reach a decision based on an
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601 (1989).  When deciding whether or not
to revoke probation, the district court must determine “whether the probation is achieving the
goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection
of society.” Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312.
In this case, the district court did not sufficiently consider Mr. Adeng’s mental health
issues, as required by statute. See I.C. § 19-2523; Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).
Up to the most recent disposition hearing, there was nothing really to consider in that regard
since the evaluations had all indicated that Mr. Adeng did not suffer from a serious mental
illness.  (See PSI, pp.154-55, 183.)  However, that changed after Mr. Adeng completed his rider
program when his brother died.  (See Tr., p.26, L.22 - p.27, L.3; PSI, p.17; R., p.167.)  After that
event, Mr. Adeng began presenting with an SMI or other mental health needs which was due to a
new prospective diagnoses of depression, anxiety, and acute stress disorders.  (See PSI, pp.27,
41.)
The new mental health evaluations also explained the symptoms of these conditions
require some form of treatment, and that treatment could be achieved in the community.
(See PSI, pp.27, 42.)  It does not appear that Mr. Adeng was afforded a meaningful opportunity
to  get  mental  health  treatment  while  he  was  on  probation.   (See R., pp.214-15 (indicating
Mr. Adeng was only required to participate in a vocational rehabilitation program, AA/NA, and
the rider aftercare program, as opposed to specific mental health treatment programs); see also
R., p.215 (indicating that intermediate options were used during the period of probation, but none
of which included mental health treatment).)  In fact, as the probation officer noted, the terms of
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probation only required Mr. Adeng complete such mental  health treatment as recommended by
the GAIN or mental health evaluation.  (PSI, p.33; accord R., p.170.)  Up until the most recent
evaluations, conducted after the motion for probation violation, those evaluations did not make
any recommendations for specific treatment for mental health conditions.  (See PSI, pp.47, 145,
154-55, 182-90.)  Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider that new
information about Mr. Adeng’s mental health issues and the need for treatment in its disposition
decision.
Basically, in failing to sufficiently consider the nature of Mr. Adeng’s mental health
issues and the potential treatment options available to address them, the district court has failed
to address the sentencing objective with the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated should be the
district court’s initial consideration when making such decisions – rehabilitation. State v.
McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158
Idaho 103 (2015); see also Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312 (explaining that, when deciding whether to
revoke probation, the district court should evaluate whether probation has been, or could
continue, “achieving the goal of rehabilitation” consistent with the goal of protecting society).
Therefore, the district court’s decision to revoke Mr. Adeng’s probation and execute his sentence
was not made consistent with the applicable legal standards, which require the district court to
consider the defendant’s mental health issues. See I.C. § 19-2523; Hollon, 132 Idaho at 581.
Thus, that decision constitutes an abuse of its discretion.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Adeng respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order revoking his probation
and remand this case for the district court to place him back on probation.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2017.
_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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